NEBRASKA COUNCIL OF EDUCATIONAL LEADERS, APPELLEE,
V.
NEBRASKA STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND STATE
BOARD OF EDUCATION, A GOVERNMENTAL SUBDIVISION, APPELLANTS.
189 Neb. 811, 205 N.W.2d 537
Filed March 23, 1973 No. 38630
Employers and
Employees: Associations: Labor and
Labor Relations: Collective
Bargaining.
Section 25-313, R.R.S. 1943, authorizes an unincorporated association
to represent employees in collective bargaining with employers as well as to
sue and be sued in the name of the association.
However, before it may bring an action in the courts of this state, it
must comply with the provisions of section 25-314, R.R.S. 1943.
Appeal
from the Court of Industrial Relations. Reversed
and dismissed.
Clarence
A. H. Meyer, Attorney General, and Harold Mosher, for appellants.
Moore
& Moore, for appellee.
Heard
before WHITE, C.J., SPENCER, BOSLAUGH, SMITH, McCOWN,
SPENCER,
J.
This
is an appeal from an order of the Court of Industrial Relations finding that
the plaintiff is entitled to serve as a bargaining representative for those
employees of the defendant who authorize it to act for them, and directing
defendant to undertake good faith negotiations in regard to the determination
of terms and conditions of employment and the administration of grievances.
The order of the Court of Industrial Relations is against "the
defendant" without further specificity.
We reverse and dismiss.
Plaintiff's
petition alleges that it is an unincorporated association formed by the
Lincoln-based professional employees of the division of administrative
services, division of vocational education, and division of instructional
services of the State Department of Education of the State of Nebraska for the
purpose of representation of said professional employees in all matters of
employment relations. It alleges
itself to be a labor organization as that term is defined in section 48-801,
R.S. Supp., 1969.
Both the State Department of Education and the State Board of Education are governmental agencies of the State of Nebraska, set up by the Constitution of the State of Nebraska. Article VII, sections 14 and 15, Constitution of Nebraska. The State Department of Education has general supervision of administration of the school system of the state. The duties and powers of the State Board of Education are as prescribed by the Legislature.
Plaintiff's
petition lists the two agencies as defendants, but the allegations are
specifically directed against the State Department of Education.
Nowhere in the petition does the plaintiff allege any facts which show
a primary right of the plaintiff and a legal wrong done by the State Board of
Education which involves that primary right.
The order of the Court of Industrial Relations refers only to "the
defendant" without specifying which defendant.
The
defendants set out four specific assignments of error, one of which involves
the legal capacity of the plaintiff to maintain this action.
Inasmuch as we find plaintiff did not have sufficient legal capacity to
maintain the action, we do not consider the other assignments.
Section
25-314, R.R.S. 1943, so far as material herein, provides as follows:
"Provided, when such *** unincorporated organization does not have
a usual place of doing business or activity within the state, nor a clerk or
general agent within the state, such *** unincorporated association shall
appoint an agent or agents in this state and before it is authorized to engage
in any kind of business or activity in this state such *** unincorporated
organization shall file in the office of the Secretary of State a certified
statement setting forth that such **** unincorporated organization is doing
business or conducting activities in the State of Nebraska stating the nature
of the business or activity, and designating an agent or agents within the
State of Nebraska, upon whom process, or other legal notice of the
commencement of any legal proceeding, or in the prosecution thereof may be
served;***."
It
is undisputed that the plaintiff did not file any kind of a written statement
with the Secretary of State of Nebraska. Nor
did the plaintiff prove that it had a usual place of doing business, or a
clerk or general agent within the state. The
main activity for which the plaintiff is formed is to represent its members in
the area embraced in these proceedings. This
is the purpose of its very existence. We
therefore do not agree with the Court of Industrial Relations that this
unincorporated association may bring this action, and then subsequently
qualify under section 25-314, R.R.S. 1943.
The Court of Industrial Relations states plaintiff has not yet engaged
in any business or activity. However,
it directs the "defendant" to undertake good faith negotiations with
the plaintiff on behalf of its employees.
This is the sole business or activity for which plaintiff is organized.
Section 25-313, R.R.S. 1943, authorizes an unincorporated association to represent employees in collective bargaining with employers, as well as to sue and be sued in the name of the association. However, before it may bring an action in the courts of this state, it must comply with the provisions of section 25-314, R.R.S. 1943.
The
plaintiff, having failed to comply with the provisions of section 25-314,
R.R.S. 1943, was not authorized to bring this action.
It has no legal capacity to sue. The
demurrers should have been sustained. We
reverse the judgment of the Court of Industrial Relations and dismiss the
action.
REVERSED
AND DISMISSED.
CLINTON,
J., concurs in result.
McCOWN,
J., dissenting.
The
majority opinion denies a local unincorporated labor organization the right to
sue in the courts of Nebraska because it had not filed a certified statement
with the Secretary of State stating the nature of its activities and
designating an agent or agents within the State of Nebraska upon whom process
might be served. This result is
reached on the authority of section 25-314, R.R.S. 1943.
That section deals with the service of process on unincorporated
organizations. The section
authorizes service of process by leaving a copy at the usual place of doing
business or conducting activities within the county with one of the members of
the association or with a clerk or general agent thereof or with the Secretary
of State.
The
statute then provides that when the organization "does not have a usual
place of doing business or activity within the state, nor a clerk or general
agent within the state" then before it is authorized to engage in
activities in this State, it shall file with the Secretary of State the
certified statement referred to. Failure
to file the statement is deemed an appointment of the Secretary of State for
service of all legal process against the association growing out of such
activities.
Section 25-313, R.R.S. 1943, also referred to in the majority opinion, since 1947 has authorized any company, partnership, or unincorporated labor association, such as the plaintiff, to sue and be sued in the courts of this State. That section was specifically amended in 1947 to include an unincorporated association representing employees in collective bargaining with employers. That amendment obviously came as a result of this court's decision in Hurley v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 147 Neb. 781, 25 N.W.2d 29.
From
1947 to 1959, section 25-314, R.R.S. 1943, provided only that process against
any such unincorporated association shall be served by a copy left at its
usual place of doing business or activity, or had a clerk or a general agent,
to register with the Secretary of State before it could invoke the
jurisdiction of the courts of Nebraska. The
statement in 1959 indicates that the amendment was intended as an expansion of
the power to serve nonresidents with process in a fashion similar to service
on nonresident employers as provided by section 48-175.01, R.R.S. 1943.
In the floor debate in 1961, Senator McHugh, who introduced the 1961
amendment, stated that the effect of the bill was to make available the same
process for nonresident associations as was available for foreign
corporations.
The
interpretation of section 25-314, R.R.S. 1943, now adopted by the majority of
this court not only treats resident and nonresident unincorporated
associations as exactly the same but also disregards the specific language of
section 25-313, R.R.S. 1943. The
majority holding now means that resident local partnerships, firms, or
unincorporated organizations will all be required to file a certified
statement in the office of the Secretary of State announcing the nature of
their business or activity and designating an agent or agents in the State of
Nebraska upon whom process may be served.
Until they do, all such organizations will be denied the right to file
suit in Nebraska courts even though they are specifically authorized to do so
by section 25-313, R.R.S. 1943.
It should also be pointed out that section 25-314, R.R.S. 1943, sets out the only statutory consequence of failing to file such a certified statement. The statute itself provides that the doing of business or conducting activities within the State of Nebraska without filing the certified statement and designating an agent shall be deemed an appointment of the Secretary of State as its true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all legal process in any action or proceeding against it growing out of such business or activities.
The
majority opinion leaps the gulf of establishing the critical fact of whether the
plaintiff had a usual place of doing business, or a clerk or general agent in
the State by stating: "Nor did
the plaintiff prove that it had a usual place of doing business, or a clerk or
general agent within the state." It
might much more appropriately be said that there is absolutely no proof of any
kind that the plaintiff did not have a usual place of conducting activities or a
clerk or general agent within the State. There
is not even an allegation in the pleadings to support such a conclusion.
On the contrary, the exhibits admitted in evidence in the Court of
Industrial Relations and the testimony in the record show that the plaintiff is
an unincorporated association whose members are all employees of the defendant
and based in Lincoln, Nebraska. The
plaintiff is a labor organization and is not affiliated with any other labor
organization. A copy of the
constitution of the plaintiff was in evidence.
The names of its executive committee appear and were known to the
defendants. To assume that the
plaintiff does not have a usual place of doing business or conducting activity
within the State nor a clerk or general agent simply disregards the testimony
and every reasonable inference which can be drawn from the evidence.
In addition, it is quite clear that the burden of proving that plaintiff
was subject to the certified statement requirement of section 25-314, R.R.S.
1943, and had no standing to use the courts of Nebraska in the absence of such a
statement rested on the defendants and not on the plaintiff.
The
majority opinion leaps the gulf of establishing the critical fact of whether the
plaintiff had a usual place of doing business, or a clerk or general agent in
the State by stating: "Nor did
the plaintiff prove that it had a usual place of doing business, or a clerk or
general agent within the state." It
might much more appropriately be said that there is absolutely no proof of any
kind that the plaintiff did not have a usual place of conducting activities or a
clerk or general agent within the State. There
is not even an allegation in the pleadings to support such a conclusion.
On the contrary, the exhibits admitted in evidence in the Court of
Industrial Relations and the testimony in the record show that the plaintiff is
an unincorporated association whose members are all employees of the defendant
and based in Lincoln, Nebraska. The
plaintiff is a labor organization and is not affiliated with any other labor
organization. A copy of the
constitution of the plaintiff was in evidence.
The names of its executive committee appear and were known to the
defendants. To assume that the
plaintiff does not have a usual place of doing business or conducting activity
within the State nor a clerk or general agent simply disregards the testimony
and every reasonable inference which can be drawn from the evidence.
In addition, it is quite clear that the burden of proving that plaintiff
was subject to the certified statement requirement of section 25-314, R.R.S.
1943, and had no standing to use the courts of Nebraska in the absence of such a
statement rested on the defendants and not on the plaintiff.
The
majority opinion not only reaches an erroneous result in this case but unduly
and unnecessarily complicates future litigation by and against resident Nebraska
unincorporated companies, associations, partnerships, and organizations.