V.
GAME
AND PARKS COMMISSION, STATE OF
V.
DEPARTMENT
OF ROADS, STATE OF
220
Filed
September 27, 1985, Nos. 84-519, 84-520
1. Commission of Industrial Relations:
Administrative Law. The Commission of Industrial Relations is not a court but is
an administrative body performing a legislative function.
2. Administrative Law: Legislature. It is
fundamental that in the legislative grant of power to an administrative agency
such power must be limited to the express legislative purpose and administered
in accordance with standards described in the legislative act.
3. Commission of Industrial Relations:
Jurisdiction. The statutory jurisdiction of the Commission of Industrial
Relations is to settle pending controversies.
4. _______: _______. The Commission of
Industrial Relations has no authority to enter declaratory judgments or exercise
other judicial functions.
5. _______: _______. A request for an
advisory determination that does not result in the settlement of an industrial
dispute is beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission of Industrial Relations.
Appeal from the
Robert Wm. Chapin, Jr., of Mowbray &
Chapin, P.C., for appellant.
Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General, and Ruth
Anne E. Galter, for appellees.
KRIVOSHA, C.J., BOSLAUGH, WHITE, HASTINGS,
SHANAHAN, and GRANT, JJ.
WHITE, J.
This is an
appeal by the Nebraska Association of Public Employees (NAPE) from two orders of
the Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR) dismissing NAPE's amended petitions
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
NAPE is the
certified, exclusive bargaining agent for the employees of the Game and Parks
Commission and the Department of Roads. Appellant submitted proposals for the
1984-85 contracts. The appellee also submitted proposals and counterproposals in
each case. The parties met several times but failed to reach an agreement, due
to conflicting legal opinions regarding what terms could properly be negotiated.
On April 5, 1984, the appellant filed a petition with the CIR in each case,
requesting that it define the mandatory noneconomic terms and conditions of
employment with respect to which the appellee is obligated to bargain under
Nebraska's public employment bargaining laws and that the CIR enter a bargaining
order for the 1984-85 contract year.
After a
preliminary proceeding pursuant to Neb.
Rev. Stat.
§ 48-816 (Reissue 1984), in which the CIR ordered NAPE to show cause why the
proceeding should not be dismissed, the appellant submitted amended petitions
asserting that the jurisdiction of the CIR was invoked by the rules of the CIR.
The CIR dismissed the petitions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, relying
on Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-837 (Reissue 1984), which, according to the CIR,
"requires collective bargaining agreements with state agencies to be
submitted for approval by the Legislature at the same legislative session as the
budget for that period is adopted by the Legislature." We affirm for
different reasons than those relied on by the CIR.
The appellant
claims that the CIR erred in dismissing appellant's case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction in accordance with its interpretation of § 48-837. We do
not reach that issue.
We have
previously said that the CIR is not a court but is an administrative body
performing a legislative function. Transport Workers of
It is
fundamental that in the legislative grant of power to an administrative agency
such power must be limited to the express legislative purpose and administered
in accordance with standards described in the legislative act. University
Police Officers Union v.
The authority
of the CIR is carefully prescribed by statute. Its jurisdiction is clearly
defined and is limited to what are clearly legislative concerns. See University
Police Officers Union, supra. Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 48-810 (Reissue 1984)
describes the jurisdiction of the CIR and states in part: "All industrial
disputes involving governmental service, service of a public utility, or other
disputes as the Legislature may provide shall be settled by invoking the
jurisdiction of the Commission of Industrial Relations . . . ." Section
48-837 further states:
Public employees shall have the right to form, join and participate in, or to
refrain from forming, joining, or participating in, any employee organization of
their own choosing. Public employees shall have the right to be represented by
employee organizations to negotiate collectively with their public employers in
the determination of their terms and conditions of employment, and the
administration of grievances arising thereunder; Provided, that any such
agreements with the State of Nebraska or any agency thereof shall cover an
annual period coinciding with the annual budgeting period of the state and shall
be subject to approval by the Legislature.
The statutory
jurisdiction of the CIR is to settle pending controversies, § 48-810. We have
said that the CIR has no authority to enter declaratory judgments or exercise
other judicial functions.
In the instant
cases the CIR did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the cases and
properly dismissed them.
AFFIRMED.
CAPORALE, J.,
not participating.
BOSLAUGH, J.,
concurs in the result.
KRIVOSHA, C.J.,
concurring in the result.
I concur in
the result reached by the majority in this case. I write separately, however,
because I believe that the court's failure to refer to our earlier decision of State
Code Agencies Ed. Assn. v. Department of Pub. Insts., 219 Neb. 555, 364
N.W.2d 44 (1985), and either to point out how these two cases can be
distinguished or to acknowledge that we were in error in our earlier decision
and should now overrule that case only adds further confusion to this entire
area.
In our earlier
decision we concluded by noting at 559, 364 N.W.2d at 46-47: "What may be a
proper recourse available to petitioners or a permissible response by the
Legislature to the order of the CIR establishing wages for agency or department
employees are matters not presently before the court." Though we did not
consider how the order of the CIR could be enforced in view of the fact that the
Legislature had already appropriated the funds for the departments and agencies
of the state in the cases before the CIR, we nevertheless concluded that the CIR
had jurisdiction to set the wage rate, theoretical or advisory as that act might
be.
In the present
case we have concluded that the CIR did not have jurisdiction because the matter
presented to the CIR in each case would not result in a settlement of an
industrial dispute and therefore was advisory in nature. While there may be some
distinction between the two, at this moment I have difficulty seeing what that
may be. I am inclined, however, to believe that the current decision is correct
and that our decision in the earlier case of State Code Agencies Ed. Assn. v.
Department of Pub. Insts., supra, was in error. In my view we should now resolve
that confusion by either acknowledging the conflict or explaining the
difference. No one is served by simply ignoring the issue.