V.
253
Filed
January 16, 1998, No. S-96-594
1. Commission of Industrial Relations: Appeal
and Error. The standard of review by the Nebraska Supreme Court of orders and
decisions of the Nebraska Commission of Industrial Relations is whether the
commission's order is supported by substantial evidence, whether the commission
acted within the scope of its statutory authority, and whether its action was
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
2. Parties: Words and Phrases. An
indispensable or necessary party to a suit is one who has an interest in the
controversy to an extent that such party's absence from the proceedings prevents
a court from making a final determination concerning the controversy without
affecting such party's interest.
3. Employer and Employee: Words and Phrases. Neb.
Rev. Stat. §
48-801(4) (Reissue 1993) of the Industrial Relations Act defines employer as
"the State of
4. Employer and Employee. Several nominally
separate business entities are considered to be a single employer where they
compose an "integrated enterprise." The controlling criterion in
making this determination is whether there are interrelations of operations,
common management, and centralized control of labor relations.
Appeal from the
Jerry L. Pigsley, of Harding, Shultz &
Downs, and Jerom E. Janulewicz and Mark J. Young, Deputy Hall County Attorneys,
for appellants.
Edward F. Pohren, of Dwyer, Smith, Grimm, Gardner, Lazer, Pohren & Rogers,
for appellee.
WHITE, C.J., CAPORALE, WRIGHT, CONNOLLY,
GERRARD, STEPHAN, and MCCORMACK, JJ.
CONNOLLY, J.
The appellee,
Hall County Public Defenders Organization (HCPDO), filed an election petition
with the Nebraska Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR), seeking an election
recognizing the HCPDO as the bargaining unit for the deputy public defenders in
the
BACKGROUND
During the
1995-96 budget process, Piccolo sought wage increases for the four deputy public
defenders in his office in order to equalize the wages of the deputy public
defenders with the wages of attorneys in the Hall County Attorney's office. The
county board refused the wage increases. As a result, the four deputy public
defenders filed an election petition with the CIR, seeking an election to
recognize the HCPDO as their bargaining unit.
The county
refused to recognize the HCPDO as a bargaining unit and answered with three
affirmative defenses: (1) Piccolo, as the employer of the deputy public
defenders, was a necessary party to the action; (2) the showing of interest
authorizations signed by the deputy public defenders were invalid because
Piccolo was involved in seeking union representation; and (3) the petition did
not exclude supervisors from the bargaining unit.
The record
indicates that Piccolo receives operating policies, personnel policies, and
budget requirements from the county board. However, the record also indicates
that Piccolo is not required to follow the personnel policies that he receives.
For example, Piccolo has chosen not to use the performance evaluations and other
documents that are suggested by the county board. In addition, some items, such
as the policies procedure manual, are made and adopted by the county officials,
not the county board. Piccolo also withdrew his office from representing
paternity and child support cases without consulting the county board.
Piccolo
testified that the county sets the salaries for the employees in his office and
that the county board had denied his request for an increase in salaries.
Piccolo also testified that the county board has traditionally given the elected
public defender a lot of discretion in determining office policies but that he
believes that technically the county has the power to set the working
conditions, wages, and benefits of the employees in his office.
Robert Leslie,
a member of the county board, testified that the public defender's office is
subordinate to the county board by the amount of money that is budgeted and that
this was the only control the county board had over the office. Leslie further
testified that the county board has not hired, fired, transferred, promoted,
laid off, recalled, rewarded, disciplined, or assigned work to the employees of
the public defender's office or made recommendations to the elected public
defender regarding these things. Leslie also testified that the county fixes the
salary budget for the public defender's office, but that the public defender,
Piccolo, decides how to apportion that budget among the deputies in his office.
Leslie further testified that prior to the filing of the election petition, he
was unaware of a possible difference in statutes regarding the setting of
salaries for the public defender's office as compared to the offices of other
elected officials.
The CIR concluded
that Piccolo was not a necessary party to the action because of this court's
holding in Sarpy Co. Pub. Emp. Assn. v.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The county
assigns that the CIR erred in (1) determining that two deputy public defenders
were not supervisors and including them in the same bargaining unit as employees
they supervised, (2) deciding that the showing of interest authorizations
executed by the deputy public defenders were not invalid because of Piccolo's
involvement in seeking union representation of the employees in his office, and
(3) deciding that Piccolo is not a necessary and indispensable party respondent
in the case. Because of our conclusion, we address only the necessary party
issue.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard
of review by this court in reviewing a decision of the CIR is whether the CIR's
order is supported by substantial evidence, whether the CIR acted within the
scope of its statutory authority, and whether its action was arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable.
When reviewing
a question of law, an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of the
lower court's ruling. Continental Western Ins. Co. v. Swartzendruber, ante
p. 365, 570 N.W.2d 708 (1997); Wolgamott v. Abramson, ante p. 350, 570
N.W.2d 818 (1997); Whalen v. U S West Communications, ante p. 334, 570
N.W.2d 531 (1997).
ANALYSIS
PICCOLO AS NECESSARY PARTY
The county
contends that Piccolo should have been joined as a necessary party to the action
because he is an "employer" of the deputies in his office as
contemplated by the Industrial Relations Act, Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 48-801 et seq. (Reissue 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
An
indispensable or necessary party to a suit is one who has an interest in the
controversy to an extent that such party's absence from the proceedings prevents
a court from making a final determination concerning the controversy without
affecting such party's interest. Calabro v. City of
Section
48-801(4) of the Industrial Relations Act defines employer as "the State of
In Sarpy
Co. Pub. Emp. Assn., we addressed the question of who, between the county
board and the elected county officials, was the appropriate entity to speak on
behalf of the county in collective bargaining. The CIR had determined that a
joint employer relationship existed, but this court disagreed and reversed. In Sarpy
Co. Pub. Emp. Assn., we relied on our decision in Bass v.
This court has
previously applied private sector cases controlled by the National Labor
Relations Act in order to determine whether or not a joint employer relationship
exists between two possible employers. In American Fed. S., C., & M. Emp.,
AFL-CIO v. County of Lancaster, 196 Neb. 89, 241 N.W.2d 523 (1976), we
recognized that the National Labor Relations Board considers several nominally
separate business entities to be a single employer where they compose an
"integrated enterprise." The controlling criterion in making this
determination is whether there are interrelations of operations, common
management, and centralized control of labor relations. American Fed. S., C.,
& M. Emp., AFL-CIO v.
In American
Fed. S., C., & M. Emp., AFL-CIO, we determined that specific statutory
and regulatory provisions acted to take from the county board of welfare much of
the prerogative it had with respect to personnel management because the county
employees in the case were included under a joint merit system whereby the
county board of welfare and the state department of welfare were treated as one
agency. In addition, extensive regulations acted to require state approval of
job related matters such as applications and examinations, job appointments,
promotions, transfers, demotions, separations, tenure, reinstatements, and
appeals of grievances. From these facts, we found that centralized control
existed and concluded that it would be inappropriate to require only the county
to bargain with employees of the public welfare department, because the county
had no control over many areas usually embraced by labor agreements. Rather,
much of that control had been transferred to the state by statute.
The statutory
scheme in the instant case is not as extensive as the statutory and regulatory
scheme seen in American Fed. S., C., & M. Emp., AFL-CIO. In the
instant case, a specific statute, § 23- 3403, has acted to shift control over
the setting of salaries to the county board. However, the fact that the county
board has the authority to disapprove a public defender's budget request does
not mean the county board has authority to control other aspects of the public
defender's office. Rather, the county sets the salaries for the public
defender's office while the public defender, as an independent elected official,
controls much of the non-salary-related working conditions. For example, the
record shows that Piccolo decides which personnel policies to use and chose to
have his deputies withdraw from paternity and child support cases without
obtaining prior approval of the county board. As the elected official, Piccolo
is also the person who has the authority to do such things as determine working
hours, approve vacations, and assign work to employees. The record indicates
that the county board does not hire, fire, or promote Piccolo's employees. Thus,
it is likely there are bargainable issues over which only the public defender,
Piccolo, has control.
Of particular
importance is the fact that Piccolo and the county board exercise common control
over the key item of contention in this case, the salaries of the deputy public
defenders. While the county board has authority to set salaries for the deputy
public defenders by having the authority to disapprove or reduce a public
defender's budget request, the record reflects that the county board does not
explicitly dictate how much each individual deputy public defender is paid.
Rather, the county board sets the total budget, and Piccolo determines the
individual salaries among the deputies. Thus, Piccolo has the ability to pay
some deputies more than others and can allocate the budget as he sees fit.
In the instant
case, a joint employment relationship is necessary because neither party acting
alone can effectively bargain regarding all of the compensation and
working-condition issues that are normally embraced by labor agreements.
Therefore, we conclude that the CIR erred in its determination that Piccolo was
not a necessary party. The election to determine a bargaining agent held
pursuant to the order of the CIR is hereby set aside. We reverse the order of
the CIR and remand the cause to the CIR with directions to dismiss.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS TO
DISMISS.